Annex "A" Subparagraph 1f,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

563 Owing to the fact that the majority of the population in Southwest China are Han Chinese who have migrated from provinces in East, North, and Central-South China, and that the Southwest has been under Chinese rule for centuries, the social structure of the Han Chinese in Southwest China closely resembles that of other regions of China. However, the presence of a large number of ethnic minorities in this region gives the over-all social structure of the region a unique character. Those minorities who have adopted Han Chinese culture are integrated into the social structure of the Han Chinese; those who remain isolated and unassimilated have their own separate social structures peculiar to their own cultures, which are not yet sufficiently investigated and understood by people outside of these groups.[1] The scope of this chapter is therefore limited to the social structure of the majority people, i.e., the Han Chinese and those ethnic minorities who have adopted the Han Chinese way of life in the Southwest.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

565A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed

1. Consult chapter on Ethnic Groups in this handbook.

[redacted]

525 society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants, it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top layers of the farming, merchant, and governing groups.[2]

In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage; retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible; the social distinction between a craftsman and a simple peasant was even more difficult to draw; and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification.

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2. In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However, as their prosperity increased, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce. Toward the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912), there emerged in coastal provinces a group of

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However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to possess land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking.

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Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and, to a large extent, the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holding of [3]

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gentry-merchants who purchased the rank of tao-t'ai (circuit judge) and were given positions in the official custom banks. Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954, pp. 214-15.

3. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1945, p. 132; Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948, p. 4. Hsu's book is a study of a small semi-rural community in Southwest China. It is his conviction, as stated in the preface, that the essential social structure of the community he had studied is typical of China as a whole. See also, Fei H[illegible]tung, China's Gentry, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Particular reference to SWChina in rural-urban relations and life-histories of gentry families.

565 any one family seldom remained constant for more than two or three generations. These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There are definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy.

B. Social Mobility

565 428 596 The family ideal. Large families, especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[4] However, in practice, the ideal was limited by economic means. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions, individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families and particularly when land was the sole source of income.[5] On the

4. Consult chapter on Family in this handbook.

5. "In the matter of inheritance, the general pattern observed for poor agriculturalists holds very well for the merchant group. Just as at the death of a farmer, there is a sharing of the property. In the agricultural situation, however, there seems to be greater fragmentation of the legacy, each son working his share more or less independently and with a minimum of combination. In the merchant situation there is somewhat more cohesion among heirs, who often work the inherited enterprise as partners." Morton H. Fried, Fabric of Chinese Society, New York, Praeger, 1953, p. 52.

565 other hand, because of the existence of extended
596 families and the clan structure, less fortunate
428 members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

183 The scholar ideal. Learning was much es-
565 teemed, especially when combined with wealth.
555 The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indicative of the respect all Chinese had for learning was the popular saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[6] The emphasis

6. This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China, Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be oversimple, it indicates that the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected
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183 565 555 on learning was buttressed by the imperial examination system, the means by which official positions were obtained, which, in turn, during peace time was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal in education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great sacrifice educated one or more of their sons in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of the son's eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the familes, be they of the landed, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study with no assurance of economic return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills and

6. [continued] ...by corporation law instead of official favoritism, and capable of supplying the investment capital needed for industrialization. Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 274-75.

183 commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar
565 did not pass the examination, or having passed
555 it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

The scholars, therefore, are not to be regarded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only a way to added prestige.

The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often by-passed

183 in time of chaos; then military skills would enable
565 individuals to obtain high positions in the bureau-
555 cracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity to acquire learning under tutelage of well-known scholars due to their parents' wealth.

C. Social Organizations

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Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

In the rural areas, organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of its members against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class and occupational lines. When landlords were forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, organized peasants and tenant at times became so powerful that they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents.

575 of people from East China into Southwest China during the war with Japan, the Ch'ing-pang organization was extended to the Southwest as well.

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, so did the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite become contributing factors in the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

178 369 565 The traditional rural village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of whom owned land; the village gentry, that is to say, the local leaders, were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[10]

178 369 166 However, the growth of rural population without a comparable increase in arable land together with more opportunity for employment

10. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

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178 and intelligible to the younger generation than the
871 classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the student, it at least had taught him not to be resigned to his lot, but to look to the future rather
178 than to the past for betterment. With the in-
871 crease of schools, there emerged in the cities
565 a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together; and with their newly established organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although frequently dependent for subsistence on their families, students had nothing to do with the cultivation or management
178 of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to
565 find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast with the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions in the ruling elite class, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social nobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social rôles were less clearly defined; sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status

178 565 in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

178 565 668 Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in the new schools, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders in China shows that the majority of them came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and had attended modern schools.[12] The labor unions, the peasants' associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new career.

178 70 874 555 565 During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaigns

12. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their prestige to their military skill, suggest the reputation acquired by military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists, like Communists elsewhere, claim adherence to orthodoz Marxist teachings. They analyze the existing social structure in China in terms of the theory of class struggle and insist on the inevitability of a classless society. In the name of evolving toward this state they justify the liquidation of certain segments of the Chinese population "which stand in the way of the regime." Doing so, they cause changes in the social structure of China.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included

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668 the Kuomintang leader Chiang-Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" like H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the "New Democratic Stage" and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved: by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the "New Democratic Stage" formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists to have marked the conclusion of the "New Democratic Stage: and the beginning of a transitional period which will lead China to socialism. Land reform had been completed and the landlords as a class eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists, and merchants, had been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" had been officially established as the ideology for all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

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668 The Chinese Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." The Party acknowledges that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists says that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and have not had time to develop the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, rural organizations such as the peasants' associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

596 of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in Southwest China.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

594 596 565 183 The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant class. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

2. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

3. Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still,

181 adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

565 184 The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. Especially in Southwest China, where warlords ruled until the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan, the development of a national feeling among the farmers has been late and slow. However, the cessation 565 722 of what used to be perpetual skirmishes between 184 warlords and the presence of a single centralized authority during World War II furnished many farmers in this region with a basis on which to form a concept of nationalism. Although no part of Southwest China was overrun by Japanese troops, the experiences of enemy bombings, anti-Japanese propaganda, and contact with refugees made

565 722 184 many farmers realize that the Yangtze River gorges were not a dependable natural defense, and that they could no longer live in an "isolated utopia" in West China, as Szechwan Province had been traditionally regarded.

The Communists have been making intensive efforts to "educate" the farmers. Although the learning of a few political terms is not enough to make the farmer nationalistic, at least he knows more about China as a nation than he ever did in the past.

423 565 184 The idea that he is to be given land of his own (and concomitant responsibility) probably has generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant who always believed he wanted to own land. To be sure, his gain through the process of land reform must have given the peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce impose restrictions on the farmer. Compared with Central-South China, land reform and the establishment of co-operatives were carried out rapidly and with less resistance in this region. The fact that all farmers have been permitted to retain title to their land has led the peasantry to give support to the regime. Good crops, which have made this a grain-surplus region since 1953, helped to maintain the illusion of a prospering society.

184 177 565 The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture was originally derived from contact with

179 565 184 foreign missionaries. In Southwest China, foreign churches were seen only in a few larger cities. The presence of American troops in Kunming, Chengtu, and a few other cities where military installations were located during the war against Japan made possible a different view of the foreigner. The farmer's reaction to the sight of a swashbuckling American soldier was generally puzzlement, envy, and a measure of disapproval. But on the whole, very few farmers in this region have had much experience with foreigners, nor did anti-foreign uprisings in the past directly involve the Southwestern farmer. The frightening image of "Western imperialism" created by Communist propaganda organs, therefore, is likely to pose no meaningful threat to these long-isolated people. The majority of the farmers in this region are not concerned with the fate of foreign missionaries in Communist China.

565 184 The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring more land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer's hopes for obtaining land are strictly limited, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed into the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which

575 Farmers active in secret societies, which
565 are traditionally opposed to government control,
184 may have a different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) sect was reported active as late as the summer of 1955 and apparently has survived Communist efforts to stamp it out. Other secret societies are of minor importance in comparison with those operating in Central-South or East China

II. URBAN WORKERS

565 Southwest China had been backward in indus-
178 trial development until the late 1930's when
184 some industrial plants were moved from the coastal areas to places like Chungking and Wanhsien in Szechwan Province. Even as late as 1952 there were still very few industrial workers in this region. Most of them were not organized until after 1949 and were not involved in earlier political movements. Before unionization, industrial workers in Southwest China had no greater national feeling than was commong among the farmers.

565 The Communists' avowed attempt to raise
184 the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the New China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most

565 of these benefits are limited and there have been
184 only a small number of beneficiaries.

565 On the liability side of the Communist policy
466 toward the worker are: the lack of substantial
184 increase in the standard of living, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and growing disillusionment as it becomes obvious that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the New China. The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against overwork and overly rigid demands upon the time and temper of the laborer indicate that the laboring class is not necessarily most productive under pressure. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new, Communist-fostered managerial class, which, for whatever reasons, receives more benefits than does manual labor.

565 Foreign advisers had been employed in many
648 Chinese factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to recognizing the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. There is no evidence to suggest that many Russian technicians or advisers are employed in factories in this region, or that those employed have caused resentment among the native workers.

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184 The Chinese worker has not abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. The promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government bureaucracy may satisfy some of the workers, but the lack of a substantial increase in their standard of living will lead many to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Communist regi me.

III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals may differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of power among the nations. After five years of Communist

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rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified. But on the negative side, severe restrictions on intellectual freedom have been imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a feeling of insecurity among many of the intellectual group.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government, the principal means to wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal amibitons, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is undoubtedly welcomed. So far, the vast underdeveloped areas in Southwest China have offered a great challenge to the educated, and many who accepted assignments in such areas have been reported to feel that they finally have started contributing to the welfare of their country. However, it must be remembered that in an effort to place college graduates and other trained personnel where they are most needed, the Communist govern-

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ment has been guilty of misassignments which have caused dissatisfaction and open criticism in the Communist press.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had enthusiastic support among most of the students. Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in the regime less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

VI. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-businessmen and manufacturers, who made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist in reduced numbers. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in the traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new, and an industrialist's position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had been forced to operate under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers

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except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy," and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly harsh and ever more difficult to evade. In Southwest China, this mood may not be easily discernible since there are fewer large commercial and industrial centers.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their amibitons. Some members of this class who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by co-operating with

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565 184 the Communist regime. In this connection, the Communists have appointed a few erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

Ad additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on export trade. Southwest China has a few traditionally profitable export commodities, such as tung-oil, hog bristles, and foodstuffs. Now that the government has virtually completed its monopoly of export trade, the merchants are denied of the opportunity to take part in this lucrative undertaking.

V. WOMEN

562 184 The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition is so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their rights in pre-Communist days, and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have thus assumed more active roles in society are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men

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669 Yunnan's border with Burma and within ethnic minority areas of the province. In December 1952, the Communists announced the capture of the last Nationalist stronghold inside Yunnan and the annihilation of 21,573 Nationalist soldiers and intelligence agents. However, the presence of Kuomintang forces under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan across the Yunnan border in Burma constituted a continuous threat to the province's security until they were withdrawn to Formosa in late 1954.

In Sikang, the "bandit-suppression" campaign was on a much smaller scale.[7] It lasted from February to November of 1950 and was reported to have destroyed 30,000 "bandits."

B. Landlords

565 668 Under the Land Reform Law and the joint directive of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court,

7. Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, pp. 1071-73.

565 landlords were convicted of a variety of crimes
668 during the Land Reform Movement. Punishment ranged from death to short terms of imprisonment. After release from prison, landlords were given a small piece of land to work and placed under the surveillance of public security agencies or were required to
[697] serve in forced-labor camps. During and after the Land Reform Movement, forced-labor units were established throughout the Southwest Region, and nearly every county maintained a forced-labor battalion.[8] These battalions were engaged in all types of construction from the building and repairing of roads in ethnic minority areas to the extraction of minerals in mining areas. Still other landlords were classified as counter-revolutionaries within the meaning of the term as used in the Decree on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council[9] in Feb. 1951. They

8. For example, see report on the province of Kweichow, New China Daily, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 1.

9. Text of the regulation in People's Daily, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1.

565 were deprived of their political rights and
668 subject to surveillance for at least three years as well as being made liable to forced labor at any time and in any place they were needed.

A new type of "potential landlord," regarded by the Communists as hostile to the new regime, came into existence after land reform. This "new rich" group was composed of Party members and former middle peasants who had acquired wealth following the redistribution of land. Since 1953, they have been accused of such hostile acts against the state as seizing control of rural governments, destroying agricultural producers' co-operatives, and disrupting Communist political control in rural areas. Cases of these kinds have been reported everywhere.[10] (See section on Rural Security in chapter on Public Order and Safety.) According to Communist accounts, the "new rich" group destroyed rural co-operatives by bribing Party cadres and responsible persons in the organizations or by employing collaborators

10. For an early report see New China Daily, Oct. 9, 1952; for more recent accounts see the reports of deputies to the National People's Congress, People's Daily, July 29, 1955, pp. 5, 6; and July 31, 1955, p. 3.

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565 to infilitrate and capture key positions. Through
568 these agents, the "potential landlords" spread rumors among the peasants, falsified co-operative accounts, and engaged in other disruptive maneuvers to disorganize the co-operatives' work and membership.

C. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries and Espionage Agents

668 As early as July 1950, the Government
687 Administration Council of the Central Government and the People's Supreme Court issued a joint directive calling for the suppression of all counterrevolutionaries throughout China. The directive demanded the apprehension and severe punishment of organizers of open resistance, saboteurs in factories and warehouses, and murders of government officials. Nationalist intelligence agents and "bandit leaders" were particularly singled out for elimination. However, not until the nationwide Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951 did the campaign against subversives reach major proportions and involve mass participation. At the conclusion of the movement, the foundation had been laid for the construction of a network of mass security organizations.

668 1. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951. Like other mass movements

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311 In 1955, the lowest average land holding per farm household was 8.5 shih-mou (1.4 acres) in Sikang Province; the highest average land holding per farm household was 16.9 shih-mou (2.8 acres) in Szechwan Province. The average for Szechwan is 12 per cent higher than the national average.[3]

III. LAND REFORM

423 565 The Land Reform Movement, as it affected the Southwest China region, had been partially completed in September 1951. Approximately 37 million inhabitants, in an area which included 172 hsien and 8 municipalities, had been subjected to "land reform."[4] The Communist regime had organized "poor peasants" and "farmhands" to unite with "middle peasants" in order to nullify the power of "rich peasants" and to abolish the "landlord system." The Land Reform Movement continued on to 1953. In the spring of that year, of the approximately 85 million persons who made up the rural population of the Southwest Region less than 2.2 million inhabitants had not yet experienced "land reform."[5] In spite of the vast scale on which

3. Mao Tse-tung's report, "The Collectivization Movement," Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Oct. 28, 1955.

4. Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Nov. 21, 1951.

5. Ibid., Dec, 13, 1952.

423 the program had been conducted, the Com-
565 munist cadres were ordered to complete a
"re-examination" of the success of the Land Reform Movement.

According to statistics on the redistribution of land in northern Szechwan Province, "poor peasants" and "farm hands" were given approximately 85 per cent of the average land holding for all classes of peasants and "middle peasants" received 29 per cent more than average.[6] Although all lands rented to tenants by "rich peasants" were confiscated, "rich peasants" were allowed to retain the amount of land they were able to cultivate with or without the help of "farm hands." At the end of the Land Reform Movement, the "rich peasants" still maintained an average land holding approximately 58 per cent higher than the general average for all classes of peasants.[7]

By the end of 1952, approximately 102,241,000 shih-mou (17,068,333 acres) of land, 204,830,000 heads of cattle, 10,241,500 tons of grain, 10,241,000 farm implements, and 663,100 farm buildings were estimated to have been confiscated in the Southwest China region.[8]

6. Ibid., Nov. 21, 1951.
7. Ibid.
8. see next p.

6: Liao S-5 (1943-1945)1947 AF16 Southwest China AF16

575 people apart, this source of inspiration has likewise vanished. Ideals of filial piety and of veneration for older persons, though still observed, have lost much of their former appeal as a result of the war and the infiltration of Western thought. On the other hand, *yi* and brotherhood, which are at the core of all Ko Lao Hui activities—particularly those involving social insurance and security—have not only remained cardinal principles of the society but are being observed with greater zeal than ever, largely because the security of the people is increasingly threatened by the present system of government.

575 A prominent characteristic of any secret society is the use of a special terminology by its members. For various reasons—to distinguish members from non-members, to permit members to outwit government authorities, etc.—a secret society, especially in the early stages of development, finds it convenient to designate terms of its own making which differ sufficiently from common usage to enable members to communicate with one another without being understood by the uninitiate. At present, however, the Ko Lao Hui has come so far into the open that nearly everyone knows of its existence and may join it if he so desires. Since most of its activities are common knowledge, there is no longer a need for a secret language with which to conceal them. Instead, a number of new terms have been introduced into Ko Lao Hui parlance, indicating a certain adaptation to changing conditions of society.

575 The progressive relaxation of entrance requirements to a point where almost anyone may join has made for marked local dissimilarities. The 565 wholesale entrance into the Ko Lao Hui of local warlords, retired politicians, corrupt government officials and demobilized soldiers, few of whom are interested primarily in the social aims of the society, is causing the society to engage in an increasing number of undesirable activities while at the same time encouraging the tendency toward separatism among the branches. To a Ko Lao Hui member of the old school, such a trend represents degeneration which must result ultimately in complete separation and dissolution.

575 On the other hand, it is clear that the Ko Lao Hui will retain its power until something can be found to replace it. The government, 668 though well aware of the growing power and influence of the society, has done little to combat it beyond occasionally voicing expressions of alarm. Government officials have been forbidden to join the society, and

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gung who has under him five colonies (tun, pronounced tenn in Kin tschuan), namely: Mu gung tun, Fu pien tun, Hsü tsching tun, Tsung hoa tun, Romi Tschanggu tun. Besides that, a hsie (regiment) was established in 1783 with its seat in the Ying pan gai, which belongs to the chief command of Sung pan ting.

Senggersung, Mu gung, along with Hsin Mo po, Fu pien, Lien ho kou and others, beside which dwell the natives on the mountain slopes and in the lateral valleys, also under the rule of hereditary aristocratic families (darro). In part the darro live in the ancient castles. However, most of the fortifications in Tsanla and Rardan have become ruins. The darro must annually travel to the ting at Mu gung and the more important ones among them support the tschungro as their official representatives in the yamen of the ting. Like the tu se (rgyalbo) they set great store by their class honor and marry only among themselves. The office of darro is kept within the family for many hundreds of years. If a darro family dies out, the second son of another darro is adopted. Besides this aristocracy of chieftains, of darro and officers (tschungro), there are free warrior-farmers (tschralba or kralba; kral in Tibetan meaning service), taxable farmers (tokdamba), and finally descendants of unfree people or slaves (gonag in Tibetan and Kin tschuanese, i.e., /228/ "people with black heads"), as well as bondsmen or slaves (kurme). (1)

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1. Kur literally "burden" (Tibetan); me = Mensch /Tibetan/; every Tibetan finds the carrying of burdens highly unpleasant. Ch. Das' Dict. gives kolbo for "slave."

Besides these there are priests (rgofsches in Kin tschuanese) and finally artisans, both of whom are made up of second sons of tschralba or tokdamba farmers and partly also of immigrants from other tribes.

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Since the conquest half the land in Great and Little Kin tschuan is under Chinese administration and half under Tibetan. For the Chinese part of the actual land, the owners must pay land tax to the tai ye or to the Mu gung ting, regardless of whether they are Chinese or Tibetan, just as would be the case in any other place in China. The owners have no other burdens or compulsory service. This relationship between farmers and the state therefore already gives a very modern and democratic impression.